\u3cem\u3eSayler Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District\u3c/em\u3e:  Opening the Floodgates in Local Special Government Elections by Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 72 Issue 4 
1974 
Sayler Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District: 
Opening the Floodgates in Local Special Government Elections 
Michigan Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Election Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michigan Law Review, Sayler Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District: Opening the 
Floodgates in Local Special Government Elections, 72 MICH. L. REV. 868 (1974). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol72/iss4/6 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
868 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 72:837 
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District: 
Opening the Floodgates in Local Special Government 
Elections 
In judicial review of the constitutionality of representational 
structures at the local governmental level, each citizen's constitu-
tional right to equal representation must be reconciled with the need 
for flexibility in designing local structures. Last term, in Salyer Land 
Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District,1 the Supreme 
Court faced this problem in the context of a water storage district. 
It upheld a statute that both restricted the franchise in the election 
of district directors to district landowners and allocated votes on the 
basis of the assessed value of the land owned by each voter.2 This 
Note will first analyze the merits and deficiencies of the techniques 
that the Court used in dealing with problems of local elections 
prior to Salyer and, against that background, will discuss the 
techniques used in Salyer to reconcile the competing policies. It is 
the thesis of this Note that the Salyer method is suitable for resolving 
the tension between the• need for local structural flexibility and the 
constitutional right to equal representation and that the result 
reached in that case was proper. However, as the discussion of Salyer 
will reveal, the method has a potential for misapplication. The de-
termination of when the need for local flexibility should override 
the constitutional right requires a more careful examination of the 
re/evant factors than the Salyer opinion indicates that the Court will 
perform. Although the result in Salyer seems sound, a superficial 
analysis in future cases could give inadequate protection to the con-
stitutional right. 
1. 410 U.S. 719 (1973). 
2. A companion case, Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement 
Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973) (per curiam), upheld a watershed district voting scheme that 
allowed only landowners to vote and weighted the voting according to acreage within 
the district owned by each voter. 
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The right to effective representation was developed by the Court 
in a series of opinions involving malapportionment or restrictions on 
the exercise of the franchise in federal and state legislative elections.3 
The Court subjected the justifications for such infringements to 
strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause4 on the ground that 
3. The Court has essentially I1eld that equal protection of the laws is denied 
when state legislative and congressional districts contain unequal numbers of people. In 
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1963), the Court held that the Constitution requires that 
congressional districting schemes be based on substantial equality of population among 
the various districts in order that the Constitution's fundamental goal of "equal repre-
sentation for equal numbers of people" be achieved. 376 U.S. at 18. In Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533 (1964), the Court examined Alabama's malapportioned state representative 
districts and enunciated the requirement that the seats in both houses of the state 
legislature be apportioned on a population basis. 
The Court occasionally couched its analysis in terms of the need to protect the 
right of each voter to equal participation in the political process via his ballot. See, e.g., 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964): "[T)he Equal Protection Clause guarantees 
the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of state legislators." 
However, the basic holdings of the reapportionment cases established the requirement 
that districts be apportioned so that they contain equal populations, and no attempt 
was made to ensure that equal numbers of people actually voted for each representa• 
tive. Therefore, the basic requirement in apportionment could accurately be said to be a 
protection of the right to live in an equally apportioned district, the Court's functional 
definition of equal representation. For a full discussion of this point, see Note, Reap-
po,·tionment on the Sub-State Level of Government: Equal Representation or Equal 
Vote?, 50 B.U. L. REv. 231 (1970). 
4. By the time of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), two standards of review had 
begun to evolve in equal protection cases. For a full discussion of these standards as 
used during the Warren Court era, see Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protec-
tion, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1968). For an earlier study, see Tussman &: tenBroek, The 
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 341 (1949). 
The first and older standard was the "rational relationship" test, which the Court has 
primarily used in considering social and economic regulations. Under this standard, 
"[s]tate legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power de-
spite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory dis-
crimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to 
justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). Two analytic steps are 
implicit in this approach: The statute must have a permissible legislative purpose, 
and the classification must be reasonably related to that purpose. See Note, Develop-
ments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra, at 1077-87. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee 
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 
336 U.S. 106 (1949): Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Kotcll v. Board of River Port 
Pilot Commrs., 330 U.S. 552 (1947). 
In certain cases, however, the Court has required the state to bear a heavier burden 
of justification. ,vhen the Court has detected that a "suspect classification" is present in 
the statute, it has subjected the classification to strict scrutiny and demanded that it 
be "shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest." Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971), quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 
(1969) (emphasis original). Statutory classifications that have been regarded as "suspect" 
now include race, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), national origin, Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and alienage. Graham v. Ricllardson, 403 
U.S. 365 (1971). 
Similarly, when the Court has determined that a "fundamental interest" is involved, 
it has subjected the classification to the stricter test. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618 (1969). Interests regarded as fundamental by the Court include the right to 
procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the right to travel, Shapiro v. 
0 
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the right to equal representation5 is fundamental in a democratic so-
ciety because it safeguards other important rights.6 The Court's ideal 
was equal political influence for every citizen in the selection of 
members of general legislative bodies, for all citizens are equally 
affected by the decisions of those bodies. Equal population districting 
was chosen as the institutional standard that would best achieve that 
goal.7 Unless deviations from this institutional norm could be justi-
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and the right to vote. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 
(1964). 
With regard to the right to vote, in San Antonio Independent School Dist, V, 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court emphasized that "[t]he constitutional under• 
pinnings of the right to equal treatment in the voting process can no longer be 
doubted even though, as the Court noted in Harper v. Virginia Bd, of Elections, , , , 
'the right to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned.'" 411 U.S. at 34 
n.74, quoting 383 U.S. 663, 665. The Rodriguez Court also noted that "the protected 
right ••• to participate in state elections on an equal basis with other qualified 
voters whenever the State has adopted an elective process for determining who will rep• 
resent any segment of the State's population" is "implicit in our constitutional system.'' 
411 U.S. at 35 n.78. See also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (right to vote 
"close to the core of our constitutional system'). The Court has applied strict scrutiny to 
cases involving the malapportionment of congressional districts, Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 
394 U.S. 526 (1969), the malapportionment of state legislative districts, Lucas v. Forty• 
Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964), and voter residency requirements. Dunn 
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
In most cases the choice between the rational relationship and the strict scrutiny 
tests has determined the outcome of the case. The subjection of a statute to stritt 
scrutiny has usually meant that the classification will be held invalid. See Dunn V, Blum• 
stein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). But cf, Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), In two 
recent decisions, 50-day voter residency requirements were sustained under the strict 
scrutiny test. Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973); Martson v, Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 
(1973). Subjection of a clasdfication to the rational relationship test has usually re• 
suited in validation of the statute. See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protec• 
tion, supra, at 1087. But see Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). For a discussion of 
several recent cases in which the Court has applied the rational relationship test in 
a more rigorous manner, see Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In 
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protec• 
tion, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 18-20 (1972). 
5. Although the Court has often seemed to be concerned with the need to protect 
the individual citizen's right to vote, see, e.g., Reynolds v, Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 
(1964) ("the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society'), 
the Court in Reynolds proclaimed that "achieving ••• fair and effective representation 
for all citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative apportionment.'' 377 U.S. at 
565-66. 
6. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964): "Undoubtedly, the right of 
suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially since the 
right to e."ercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other 
basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement on the right of citizens to vote 
must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.'' See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Jl8 U.S. 
89, 96 (1886). 
7. See note 3_ supra. Commentators have criticized the Court for camouflaging the 
imposition of a standard of what constitutes a republican form of government under 
the guise of implementing the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Kauper, Some Com• 
ments on the Reapportionment Cases, 63 MICH. L. REv. 243, 244 (1964) (the Court has 
centered its attention on a "specious conception of personal right rather than upon the 
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fied by a compelling reason, the Court mandated its implementa-
tion. 8 Only recently has the Court tolerated a, slight deviation from 
strict numerical equality in state legislative redistricting when that 
was necessary to accommodate a state policy of preserving political 
subdivision lines.9 
In Avery v. Midland County10 the Court first required equal 
population districting for a general governing body at the local gov-
institutional aspect of the problem"); Note, Reapportionment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1226, 
1242 (1966) ("denying a person the right to vote is different from establishing electoral 
districts containing unequal population'). 
As many commentators have pointed out, a mathematically equal population dis• 
tricting scheme is not tailored to provide representation for all voters, for minority 
voters in a district will have no "representation" in the legislature. See Dixon, The War-
ren Court Crusade for the Holy Grail of "One Man-One Vote", 1969 SUP. Cr. REv. 
219, 227. Proportional representation or "interest group" voting would guarantee 
that each voter has some representatjon. See Kauper, supra, at 227; Note, supra, at 1242. 
One commentator has countered criticisms of equal population districting as a vehicle 
for effective representation by arguing that a system of proportional or interest group 
representation would be antithetical to the American political tradition of compromise 
in that it would create sharp divisions on political issues. Auerbach, The Reapportion-
ment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote, One Value, 1964 SUP. Cr. REv. 1, 54. 
8. 'I;he first case to articulate fully the basic standard of equal population districting 
was Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1963), a case involving congressional districts. The 
Court struck down Georgia's congressional districting scheme on the basis of article I, 
section 2, of the Constitution, which requires that Representatives be chosen "by the 
People of the several States." The Court interpreted this section as requiring "as nearly 
as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as 
another's." 376 U.S. at 7-8. For state legislative apportionment, the Court held, in Rey-
nolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), that the equal protection clause mandated that "a 
State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its 
legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable." 377 U.S. at 577. This was 
essentially the Wesberry standard, but the Court in Reynolds noted that there might be 
"[s]omewhat more flexibility ... with respect to state legislative apportionment than 
in congressional districting." 377 U.S. at 578. 
Since these early cases, the Court has further developed the standards to be applied 
to both congressional and state legislative districting. In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 
526 (1969), the Court noted that the "nearly as practicable" standard of voter equality 
enunciated in Wesberry for congressional districts requires that the legislature make a 
"good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality . . . • Unless population 
variances among Congressioµal districts are shown to have resulted despite such effort, 
the State must justify each variance, no matter how small." 394 U.S. at 530-31. See also 
Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969) (companion case). In Mahan v. Howell, 410 
U.S. 315 (1973), the Court focused its attention on the standard to be applied in state 
legislative districting and noted that "the constitutionality of Virginia's legislative re-
districting plan [is] not to be judged by the more stringent standard that Kirkpatrick 
and Wells make applicable to congressional reapportionment, but instead by the equal 
protection test enunciated in Reynolds v. Sims ...• " 410 U.S. at 324. Under the latter 
standard, the Court can take into consideration factors that could not be considered 
under the Kirkpatrick standard. The Court noted in Mahan that "[a]pplication of the 
'absolute equality' test of Kirkpatrick and Wells to state legislative redistricting may 
impair the normal functioning of state and local governments." 410 U.S. at 323. 
9. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973). The Court sustained a districting plan 
in which one district was overrepresented by 6.8 per cent and another was underrepre-
sented by 9.6 per cent. 410 U.S. at 319. 
10. 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
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ernmental level. The Court found that, since units of local gov-
ernment are arms of the state and are becoming increasingly impor-
tant to their citizens,11 they are subject to the constraints of equal 
protection to the same degree as the state.12 However, it was apparent 
even before Avery13 that more specialized analytic tools would be 
11. The Avery Court said: 
"[I]nstitutions of local government have always been a major aspect of our system, 
and their responsible and responsive operation is today of increasing importance 
to the quality of life of more and more of our citizens. We therefore see httle dif• 
fcrence, in terms of the application of the Equal Protection Clause, and of the prin• 
ciples of Reynolds v. Sims, between the exercise of state power through legislatures 
and its exercise by elected officials in the cities, towns and counties." 
390 U.S. at 481. 
12. The equal protection clause reaches the exercise of state power however mani• 
fcsted, whether exercised directly or through subdivisions of the State • 
. • • If voters residing in oversize districts arc denied their constitutional right 
to participate in the election of state legislators, precisely the same kind of depriva-
tion occurs when the members of a city council, school board or county governing 
board are elected from districts of substantially unequal population. 
390 U.S. at 479-80. 
13. Two cases decided before Avery demonstrate the Court's awareness that equal 
representation doctrines could not be automatically applied to local government. Sailors 
v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967), involved a challenge to the validity of the 
electoral scheme for the Kent County (Michigan) School Board, the members of which 
were selected, not by the electors of the county, but by delegates chosen by the local 
school boards. Each board sent a delegate to a biennial meeting, and these delegates 
elected a five-member county board, the members of which were not required to be 
members of the local boards. The Court, assuming arguendo that the principles of 
Reynolds would apply to the election of local officials, held that this representational 
scheme was not subject to constitutional challenge on the basis of Reynolds because it 
was appointive, rather than elective. 387 U.S. at lll. The Court said that there was no 
reason why officials, such as the county school board members in Sailors, who were non• 
legislative, could not be appointed instead of elected. 387 U.S. at 108. The Court left 
unresolved the question whether a local legislative body (such as a city council) could 
be appointed rather than elected. 387 U.S. at 109-10. For an interesting argument that 
elections might, in some instances, be required, see Nahmod, Reflections on Appointive 
Local Government Bodies and the Right to an Election, 11 DUQUESNE L. REv. 119 (1972), 
The second case was Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967). That case arose out of the 
consolidation of the City of Virginia Beach with adjoining Princess Anne County, and 
the adoption of a borough form of government for the resulting unit. There were 
seven boroughs, with varying populations, in the consolidated city. The most populous 
contained 29,048 people, while the least populous had 733. The city charter, approved 
by the state legislature, provided that there were to be 11 councilmen for the city, all 
elected at-large. However, while four of the eleven could be elected without regard to 
residence, each of the remaining seven had to reside in a different borough. The Court 
held that this scheme did not violate the equal protection clause. The plan, the Court 
noted, used boroughs merely as a basis for residence and not for representation, so that, 
despite the residency requirement, each council member represented the whole city. 387 
U.S. at 115. Nevertheless, it is clear that this plan gave the rural (and le3S populous) 
boroughs more representation on the council than sheer numbers would othenvise have 
allocated to them, because those council members residing in the less populous rural 
boroughs would presumably have more familiarity with rural problems and would in 
fact represent rural voters better than they would urban voters. The plan was an en• 
ticement for rural areas to enter the metropolitan government. See 387 U.S. at 117. 
One commentator suggested after Sailors and Dusch that the Court was uncertain 
about its ability to remedy inequities at the local level without disrupting the pattern 
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needed to deal with the problems of representation in local govern-
ment because local units vary in the functions they perform and in 
their effects on local residents.14 Local units span a spectrum from 
those, such as school districts, that are functionally specialized to 
those, such as municipalities, that are responsible for a wide range 
of services. Any method of evaluating the constitutionality of voting 
schemes established for these widely variant institutions should rec-
ognize that, in some circumstances, the most appropriate representa-
tional structure might include unequal districting or restrictions, for' 
these would give more influence to those citizens with the greater 
interest in the decisions of the local unit.15 
In voting cases arising out of local elections, the Court has ar-
ticulated three tests. Although each test was articulated in the con-
text of a different local problem, all three are concerned with 
whether the unit in question has sucli widespread and universally 
important effects on the local population that any infringement on 
the franchise would be improper. 
The earliest method used by the Court was adopted in Avery, a 
malapportionment case, where the powers of the unit in question, 
the County Commissioners Court, and the unit's impacts on the citi-
zens were examined to determine whether deviations from equal 
population districting were permissible. The Court noted that the 
Commissioners Court exercised many important powers16 and that 
of state government and further suggested that such problems may be more amenable 
to political than to judicial solutions. See Martin, The Supreme Court and Local Gov-
ernment Reapportionment: The First Phase, 35 TENN. L. REv. 313,317 (1968)._ 
14. There are approximately 80,000 different units of local government. Included 
arc 3,043 counties, 17,996 municipalities, 17,144 townships, 18,332 special districts, and 
25,000 school districts. COI\IMITIEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MODERNIZING LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 67 (1966). For surveys of the various possibilities for the formation, valida-
tion, and operation of special districts, see J. Bou.ENS, SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES (1957); R. SMITH, PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, SPECIAL DISTRICTS AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT (1964); Hankerson, Special Governmental Districts, 35 TEXAS L. REv. 1004 
(1957). 
15. Many commentators were critical of the extension in Avery of one person-one 
vote to general local governing bodies. See, e.g., Grant &: McArthur, "One Man-One 
Vote" and County Government: Rural, Urban and Metropolitan Implications, 36 GEO. 
WAsH. L. REv. 760 (1968); Martin, The Supreme Court and Local Government Re-
apportionment: The Second Phase, 21 BAYLOR L. REv. 5 (1969). These commentators 
foresaw that a strict one person-one vote rule could make it difficult to create an insti-
tutional framework that could solve regional problems by encouraging the participation 
of many differently sized units. The idea that population should not be the sole con-
sideration in such cases was first expressed by Weinstein, Effect of Federal Reapportion-
ment Decisions on Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 1 (1965). 
16. The Court concluded: 
The Commissioners Court . • . • 
"is the general governing body of the county. It establishes a courthouse and jail, 
appoints numerous minor officials such as the county health officer, fills vacancies 
in the county offices, lets contracts in the name of the county, builds roads and 
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its decisions significantly affected every county resident.17 Since the 
Commissioners Court had such "general governmental powers,"18 
equal population districting was required. The Court issued a caveat 
that "[w]ere the Commissioners Court a special-purpose unit of gov-
ernment assigned the performance of functions affecting definable 
groups of constituents more than other constituents, we would have 
to confront the question whether such a body might be apportioned 
in ways which give greater influence to the citizens most affected by 
the organization's functions."19 
As in the decisions on state and federal legislative apportionment, 
in Avery the Court grounded its requirement of equal population 
districting on the postulate that each citizen should have an equal 
voice in institutions that affect all citizens equally. In the local case, 
however, the Court was more careful in its analysis of the effects of 
the governmental unit on the citizens, in order to ensure that the 
norm of equal districting was in fact appropriate.20 The Court rec-
ognized that, in local units where the impact on citizens is not uni-
form, other representational structures may be necessary, although 
it left unclear both the parameters of the situation in which a devia-
tion from equal popul,ation districting would be allowed and the 
permissible extent of such a deviation. The inquiry into powers and 
impacts made in Avery is a suitable method for resolving representa-
tional problems at the local level in that it possesses a high degree of 
flexibility; the analysis focuses directly on the link between individ-
ual need and institutional structure that was the cornerstone of the 
state malapportionment decisions. 
Even in a case that does not fall within the Avery caveat because 
the local unit possesses general governmental powers, some flexibility 
may be possible, as indicated by the Court's decision in Abate v. 
Mundt.21 However, the margin allowed by that case is very narrow. 
Abate involved malapportionment in the electoral districts of a 
county legislative body. Although the Court found that deviations 
from population equality required careful scrutiny because of the 
bridges, administers the county's public welfare services, performs numerous 
duties in regard to elections, sets the county ta..x rate, issues bonds, adopts the 
county budget, and serves as a board of equalization of tax assessments." 
390 U.S. at 476, quoting VERNON'S ANN. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 18, Interpretive Commen• 
tary (1955). 
17. 390 U.S. at 484. 
18. ~90 U.S. at 484-85. 
19. 390 U.S. at 483-84. 
20. In Avery the Court analyzed the powers and impacts of the governmental unit 
to determine if the unit had "general governmental powers." No such analysis had been 
undertaken in the congressional and state legislative districting cases because of the 
readily apparent widespread and important impacts present in those cases. 
21. 403 U.S. 182 (1971). 
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importance of voting rights, it tolerated an 11.9 per cent deviation 
from strict numerical equality.22 The Court based this result on its 
finding that the plan that permitted this deviation would further 
cooperation between the county and its constituent towns and on the 
long history of that cooperation23-a historical argument that seems 
at odds with the Court's observation in the same opinion that flexi-
bility is needed "to meet changing societal needs."24 The Court also 
pointed out that the deviation did not discriminate against any par-
ticular group of voters;25 it thus distinguished Hadley v. Junior 
College District,26 an earlier local malapportionment case, where an 
apportionment scheme was struck down because it systematically 
discriminated against urban voters within a metropolitan district.27 
This distinction would indicate that the room for flexibility left 
open in Abate is much smaller than that hinted at by the Avery 
caveat, for Abate would not tolerate infringements resulting from 
the purposeful allocation of more political influence to a certain geo-
graphic area by giving it more heavily weighted votes, even if the 
nonuniform impacts standard of Avery were met. Thus, the flex-
ibility of the Avery method, which might allow an exception from 
equal population districting where a local unit has a differential im-
pact on various groups of citizens, would derive from the possibility 
that the unit would fall outside the parameters of the powers and 
impacts test, not from the possibility that purposefully discrimina-
tory deviations could survive careful scrutiny. 
The major difficulty with the Avery method stems from its very 
flexibility. Precisely because the phrase "general governmental pow-· 
ers" is ambiguous, it is difficult to apply, and the method is fraught 
with the danger of a misapplication that will not adequately protect 
the cons,titutional right to effective representation. The difficulty of 
applying the concept of "general governmental powers" to a func-
tionally specialized unit is illustrated by Hadley v. Junior College 
District.28 In that case the Court struck down a representational 
scheme for the election of trustees of a junior college district.29 Even 
I 
22. See 403 U.S. at 184. 
23. 403 U.S. at 186. 
24. 403 U.S. at 185. 
25. 403 U.S. at 186. 
26. 397 U.S. 50 (1970). 
27. 403 U.S. at 186. For a description of the apportionment system in Hadley, see 
note 29 infra. 
28. 397 U.S. 50 (1970). 
29. Missouri law allowed school districts by referendum to establish a consolidated 
junior college district and elect six trustees. The law also provided that the trustees 
were to be apportioned among the school districts on the basis of each district's "school 
enumeration" (pupils betlveen the ages of 6 and 20). However, the apportionment 
scheme systematically discriminated against voters in the more populous districts. 
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though the Court admitted that the powers of the trustees were not 
so broad as those of the Midland County Commissioners, it found 
that their powers were numerous and affected all district citizens in 
such a way that equal population districting was required.30 As in 
Avery, the Court reserved the possibility that "there might be some 
case in which a State elects certain functionaries whose duties are 
so far removed from normal governmental activities and so dispro-
portionately affect different groups that a popular election in compli• 
ance with Reynolds . . . might not be required . . . ."31 
Although the Hadley Court based its holding on .the Avery doc-
trine, its language suggests a less flexible test-that the decision to 
select officials by popular election is, in itself, sufficient to require 
equal population districting.32 An inquiry into the importance to 
voters of the roles played by various officials and the purposes of 
particular elections was said to be too difficult;38 the fact that an 
official is elected was found to be "a strong enough indication that 
the choice is an important one."34 Unlike Avery, this second, or 
"popular election," method has the advantages of simplicity and 
ease of application.85 Moreover, there is no danger, in the cases 
because whenever a large district's share of the total enumeration fell within a certain 
percentage range it was allocated the number of trustees corresponding to the bottom 
or the range, while the remaining trustees were elected at-large in the smaller districts. 
Thus, Kansas· City had 50 per cent of the trustees but 60 per cent of the school enumera-
tion. 397 U.S. at 56-57. 
30. The junior college trustees had the power to "levy and collect taxes, issue 
, bonds ••• , hire and fire teachers, make contracts, collect fees, supervise and discipline 
students, pass on petitions to annex school districts, acquire property by condemnation, 
and in general manage operations of a junior college." 397 U.S. at 53. The Court said 
that "these powers, while not fully as broad as those of the Midland County Commis-
sioners, certainly show that the trustees perform important governmental functions 
within the districts, and we think these powers are general enough and have sufficient 
impact thr~mghout the district to justify the conclusion that the principle we applied 
in Avery should be applied here." 397 U.S. at 53-54. 
31. 397 U.S. at 56. 
32. See 397 U.S. at 54-55. The "popular election" standard of Hadley was dicta, for 
the Court held that the facts fit within the parameters of the Avery doctrine. See note 
30 supra. 
33. "If the ,purpose of a particular election were to be the determining factor in 
whether voters are entitled to equal voting power, courts would be faced with the diffi• 
cult job of distinguishing between various elections. We cannot readily perceive judi• 
cially manageable standards to aid in such a task." 397 U.S. at 55. 
34. 397 U.S. at 55. 
35. The simplicity of the "popular election" test is somewhat negated by the failure 
of the Court to clarify the parameters of what it regarded as a "popular election." Since 
the Hadley case was one involving local malapportionment, the test clearly covers an 
election in such a case. A question of importance is whether it would also include a 
restricted election and thus encompass the situation presented in Salyer. An argument 
against such a reading is that the inference of important impacts on all citizens, which 
the Court drew from the use of a popular election in Hadley, could not be drawn from 
an electoral scheme in which only some citizens were enfranchised. The Hadley Court 
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where there is a popular election, that the test will provide in-
adequate constitutional protection for the individual citizen. The 
disadvantage of this method is that it does not inquire whether every 
citizen needs equally effective representation, but merely presumes, 
in some cases, that every citizen does. However, there may well be 
cases in which a unit's activities are so disproportionately concen-
trated in one geographic area within its boundaries that it might 
be desirable to give the more heavily affected area more political 
influence even though an area-wide election is held. Dissenting in 
Avery, Justice Fortas noted that the County Commissioners were 
primarily concerned with rural affairs, especially rural roads, and 
that they did not service roads within the City of Midland.36 There-
fore, he was of the opinion that the norm of equal population dis-
tricting was inappropriate for the Commissioners Court; he stressed 
the need for a standard that had the "latitude of prescription" neces-
sary to accommodate "the complexities of local government."37 The 
Hadley popular election test has no latitude; it is an overinclusive, 
"blanket" test, which does not possess the analytical :flexibility to 
draw distinctions among the needs of citizens for representation iii 
different local structures with variable impacts. 
Under a third test, used by the Court in cases involving voter 
restrictions rather than malapportionments in districting, the mere 
existence of a restriction subjects the arrangement to strict scrutiny.38 
Like the popular-election test, this method sets up a blanket rule: 
The former ·test mandates equal population districting whenever 
there is a popular election; the latter triggers the application of strict 
scrutiny whenever there is a restricted franchise. 
The restriction test was used in Kramer v. Union Free School Dis-
trict,39 where the Court applied strict scrutiny to a scheme under 
which eligibility to vote in school board elections was restricted to 
residents who owned or leased taxable real property in the school 
district or who had children in the local schools. Plaintiff was a 
childless bachelor who lived with his parents. The Court noted that 
said: "[I]n an election open to all, there is no discernible, valid reason why constitu-
tional distinctions should be drawn on the basis of the purpose of the election." 397 
U.S. at 54-55 (emphasis added). This suggests that Hadley may be inapplicable to a 
restricted election. 
36. "[T]he Commissioners Court's functions and powers are quite limited, and they 
are defined and restricted so that their primary and preponderant impact is on the 
rural areas and residents. The extent of its impact on the city is quite limited." 390 
U.S. at 507. 
37. "The simplicity of the Court's ruling today does not comport with the lack of 
simplicity which characterizes the miscellany which constitutes our local governments." 
390 U.S. at 499. 
38. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969). For a dis-
cussion of the strict scrutiny test, see note 4 supra. 
39. 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
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strict scrutiny of the restrictions was appropriate because "[s]tatutes 
granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose 
the danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the govern-
mental affairs which substantially affect their lives."40 The state of 
New York claimed that the restrictions limited the franchise to those 
"primarily interested" in school affairs and that restrictions were 
necessary to ensure an informed electorate. However, the Court 
struck do,;vn the restriction; it found that, even if the state could 
limit the franchise to those "primarily interested in school affairs," 
the statute did not do so with sufficient precision to satisfy strict 
scrutiny.41 The Court pointed out that the statute would give a 
vote to a hypothetical unemployed and unconcerned young man 
who rented an apartment but paid no ta..'{es and would not allow 
the plaintiff, who was in fact very concerned with school affairs and 
paid state and federal taxes, to vote.42 
Again, like the popular-election test, the Kramer test's prime vir-
tues are simplicity of application and assured protection for the dis-
enfranchised citizen.43 Its disadvantages are twofold. First, it is a 
· rigid test that is difficult to satisfy. Even if the precision requirement 
is met, a restriction of the franchise to a specially interested group 
will apparently be upheld only if it is necessary to promote a com-
pelling state interest. Moreover, under Avery, the critical decision is 
made by focusing on the unit's powers and its impacts on citizens 
generally, while the Kramer method, at the strict scrutiny stage, 
analyzes and compares the interests of specific individuals. The stan-
dard, of precision required by the latter analysis is very high; the 
former method, in contrast, can be satisfied by looking at general 
conditions, rather than at the situations of particular individuals.44 
40. 395 U.S. at 626-27. 
41. 395 U.S. at 632. 
42. 395 U.S. at 632 n.15. 
43. The application of the strict scrutiny test has almost always resulted in the 
invalidation of the classification. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. ,330, 363·64 (1972) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); note 4 supra. But see Schindler v. Palo Verde Irrigation Dist,, 
1 Cal. App. 3d 831, 82 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1969). That case involved an equal protection chal• 
lenge to a weighted voting provision in an irrigation district established by special 
legislative act. Although the case did not involve a restriction of the franchise, the 
court felt bound by Kramer to apply strict scrutiny. The court reasoned that "[a]ny 
disparity in the statutory grant of the franchise, whether it be in the quantum of 
influence distributed among voters or in the total denial .of franchise to some of its 
grant to others, must be subjected to close judicial examination." 1 Cal. App. 3d at 837, 
82 Cal. Rptr. at 65. The court, nevertheless, upheld the provision, noting that it was 
"necessary" to further the compelling interest of land reclamation because "(a]bsent 
the voting qualification provided by the Act, it is doubtful that the District could have 
been formed or functioned." 1 Cal. App. 3d at 839, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 66. 
. 44. For a critical discussion of this aspect of Kramer, see Note, Limitations on the 
Franchise and the Standard of Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 1970 UTAH 
L. REv. 143. The analysis of Kramer and the other restriction cases stimulated many 
articles suggesting that various voting provisions were invalid, See, e.g., Gaines, The 
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Second, the Kramer method is overinclusive, as was the Hadley 
popular-election test. The application of strict scrutiny to all selec-
tive enfranchisements without a preliminary inquiry similar to the 
powers-and-impacts analysis of Avery neglects the possibility that, 
in some restriction cases, it may not be appropriate to give the dis-
enfranchised citizen political influence in the unit or decision in 
question because he is not affected by that unit or decision to the 
same degree as are others. For the Court in Kramer, however, the 
presumed possibility that the disenfranchised citizen needs represen-
tation was sufficient to trigger the application of strict scrutiny.45 
The Court may have felt that it was not necessary to make an initial 
inquiry into impacts in restriction cases, as it was in mal~pportion-
ment cases such as Avery, because the total denial of the vote-seems a 
more grievous violation of the right to effective representation than 
does dilution by malapportionment. However, a restriction on the 
franchise in an election involving a local government unit the activi-
ties of which have varying degrees of impact may be a less serious 
violation of the interest in representative government than severe 
malapportionment of districts in a general governing unit. In short, 
in restriction cases, also, there exists a need for a method that can 
accommodate this possibility. 
Despite the development of the three different tests, one con-
stant factor in the local government voting cases prior to Salyer was 
that the Court struck down any substantial46 franchise infringement, 
be it restriction or malapportionment. 
The Salyer case involved both a restriction of the franchise to 
landowners, and malapportionment in that votes were weighted ac-
cording to the value of the land mvned by each voter. Salyer did 
not, therefore, fit neatly within the parameters of any of the previous 
methods. The contested provisions concerned the election of the 
general governing body-the board of directors-of a ·w-a.ter storage 
Right of Non-Property Owners to Participate i~ a Special Assessment Majority Protest, 
20 UCLA L. REv. 201 (1972); Note, Voting Restriction in Special Districts: A Case Study 
of the Salt River Project, 1969 I.Aw 8: Soc. ORDER 636; Note, Annexation Elections and 
the Right to Vote, 20 UCLA L. REv. 1093 (1973). 
45. See 395 U.S. at 626-27. 
46. The Court has been willing to tolerate deviation from equality as large as 11.9 
per cent, at least in the presence of special circumstances. See Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 
182 (1971), discussed in text accompanying notes 21•27 supra. The Abate decision stim-
ulated varying responses by the commentators. See, e.g., Note, The Supreme Court, 1970 
Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3, 146-52 (1971) (favorable); Note, Reapportionment-Nine Years 
into the "Revolution" and Still Struggling, 70 MICH. L. REv. 586 (1972) (unfavorable). 
The recent decision in Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973), suggests that the 11.9 per 1 
cent deviation allowed in Abate will not be the limit of permissible departures from 
equality in local electoral districting. Mahan upheld a 16.4 per cent variation in the 
populations of Virginia's state legislative districts. See notes 8-9 supra; text accompany-
ing note 9 supra. 
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district.47 The provisions enfranchise only those who own land 
within the district and allocate one vote to each owner for every 
100 dollars (or part thereof) of assessed valuation of his land.48 Land-
owners who live outside the district may vote, while district residents 
may not vote unless they own land.49 Corporate landowners can also 
vote. 60 Landholdings vary immensely in size, and, at the time of the 
suit, four corporations owned eighty-five per cent of the total as-
sessed value of the district.61 
The directors' main function is to plan and supervise projects for 
the storage and distribution of water for irrigation,62 although they 
also have powers with regard to drainage, flood control, and the 
generation of hydroelectric energy.63 After a project plan has been 
dra-wn up by the directors and approved by the state, 64 it is submitted 
to district landowners for approval. At this election, which, like the 
election of the board, is restricted to landowners, the project must 
receive not only a majority of the assessed value votes, but also the 
approval of a majority of the landowners.60 In order to finance a 
project, an impartial board of commissioners assesses each separately 
owned tract according to the benefits that it is to receive from the 
project.66 
The Supreme Court upheld both the voting restriction and the 
weighting provisions in the enabling legislation. As the first step in 
its analysis, the Court assessed the functions and effects of the water 
storage district. It concluded that the case fell within the exception 
delineated in Avery and Hadley for elections of officials "'whose 
47. The statutory provisions applicable to such water storage distl'icts arc CAL, 
WATER CODE§§ 39000-48401 (West 1966), as amended (West. Supp. 1974). 
48. CAL. WATER CoDE § 41000 (West 1966) provides: "Only the holders of title to land 
are entitled to vote at a general election." CAL. WATER CODE § 41001 (West 1966) pro-
vides: "Each voter may vote in each precinct in which any of the land owned by him 
is situated and may cast one vote for each one hundred dollars (SlO0), or fraction 
thereof, worth of land, exclusive of improvements, minerals and mineral rights therein, 
in the precinct." 
49. In fact, only a few of the 307 district landowners reside within the district, and 
most of the 77 district residents own no land themselves and are employees of the large 
corporate landowners. Brief for Appellee at 22-25, Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin 
Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973). 
50. CAL. WATER CODE§ 41004 (West 1966), allows "[a]ny corporation holding title to 
land within the district ••• to vote through any officer or agent ••• of the corpora-
tion." 
51. 410 U.S. at 735. One corporate landowner, J.G. Boswell Co., owned land com• 
prising more than half of the assessed value in the district. 410 U.S. at 735. 
52. Water storage districts are formed for the limited purpose of storing and dis• 
tributing water for irrigation. CAL. WATER CODE § 43000 (West 1966). 
53. See CAL. WATER CoDE § 42200 (West Supp. 1974). 
54. The State Treasurer is empowered to investigate proposed projects. See CAL, 
WATER CODE§§ 42275, 42300-01, 42500 (West Supp. 1974). 
55. CAL. WATER CODE§ 42550 (West 1966). 
56. CAL. WATER CoDE § 46176 (\\Test 1966), 
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duties are far- removed from normal governmental activities 
and . . . disproportionately affect different groups.' "67 In support of 
this conclusion, the Court noted that the district has a limited, func-
tionally specialized purpose-providing water for irrigation-and 
does not provide "general public services."58 The Court also empha-
sized that district activities disproportionately affect one group of 
citizens-the district landowners, who pay the costs and charges of 
the projects.50 Because the case fell within the Hadley exception, the 
elections were not subjected to "the popular election requirements" 
that were imposed in preceding cases.00 Essentially, this meant that 
the provisions were not subjected to strict scrutiny. 
Instead, the Court, in the second step of its analysis, considered 
whether the provisions were " 'wholly irrelevant to achievement of 
the regulation's objectives.' "61 It concluded that there. was a ra-
tional basis for the statute's exclusion of nonlandowners, for its ex-
clusions of lessees, and for its weighted voting scheme. 62 
Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Marshall and Br~nnan, dis-
sented. The dissent criticized the majority's refusal to subject the 
voting provisions to strict scrutiny. Justice Douglas said that strict 
scrutiny was required solely because some residents were ·excluded 
from the franchise.63 Moreover, the dissent concluded that, were 
strict scrutiny applied, the restriction of the franchise to landowners 
could not be upheld because landowners as a class are not affected by 
district activities to such a greater degree than are nonlandowners 
that the owners alone should have the vote.64 The dissent 1vould also 
have invalidated the weighted voting provision; it asserted that 
"when it comes to the performance of governmental functions all 
enter the polls on an equal basis.''65 Justice Douglas criticized the 
majority's finding that the unit fell within the Hadley exception. 
He noted that the "Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District surely 
performs 'important governmental functions' which 'have sufficient 
57. 410 U.S. at 727-28, quoting Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970). 
58. 410 U.S. at 728-29. 
59. 410 U.S. at 729. 
60. 410 U.S. at 730. 
61. 410 U.S. at 730, quoting Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commrs., 330 U.S. 
552, 556 (1947). . 
62. 410 U.S. at 734-35. 
63. The basis for the minority's choice of test was that "[p]rovisions authorizing a 
selective franchise are disfavored, because they 'always pose the danger of denying some 
citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect their 
lives.'" 410 U.S. at 736, quoting Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 
(1969). 
64. "[I]rrigation, water storage, the building of levees, and Hood control, implicate 
the entire community. All residents of the district must be granted the franchise." 410 
U.S. at 738. 
65. 410 U.S. at 739. 
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impact throughout the district.' "66 In addition, he strongly criticized 
the enfranchisement of the corporate landowners. 67 
The test developed by the majority in Salyer is more flexible 
than the dissent thought permissible, given the requirements of the 
, Constitution. It consists of two stages. First, the Court looks to the 
general or special purpose of the local unit and the uniformity or 
disparity of its effects on different constituent groups. I£ the duties 
of the unit are "far removed from normal governmental activities"68 
and there is a disproportionate effect, the Court proceeds to a second 
stage, at which it asks whether there is a rational basis for the voting 
infringements. By implication, if the duties of the unit are more 
normal or the 'impact is not disproportionate, infringements on the 
franchise are subjected to strict scrutiny to determine if they are 
justified by a compelling state interest. Infringements that fail to 
pass the second-stage tests violate the equal protection clause of 
the Constitution. Although Salyer involved a restriction, as well as 
a weighted voting scheme, the first stage of the method used in 
Salyer is a direct outgrowth of the powers-and-effects analysis used 
by the Court in Avery, a malapportionment case. The language used 
in Salyer is the converse of that used in Avery: While Avery asked 
whether the unit had "general governmental powers"69 and a "broad 
range of impacts on all citizens,"70 the Salyer Court asked if the 
elected officials exercised duties that are "far removed from normal 
governmental activities"71 and "disproportionately affect different 
groups.''72 
Like Avery, Salyer does not propose a blanket test. Rather, it 
attempts to define those cases in which a structure in accord with 
one person-one vote and the unrestricted franchise is not the most 
appropriate solution to the representational problem. Again like the 
test applied in Avery to a malapportionment case, this method fo. 
cuses on the nature of the individual-institutional link by inquir-
66. 410 U.S. at 740. 
67. It is indeed grotesque to think of corporations voting within the framework of 
political representation of people. Corporations were held to be "persons" for pur-
poses both of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendinent and of the 
Equal Protection Clause. Yet, it is unthinkable in terms of the American tradi-
tion that corporations should be admitted to the franchise. Could a State allot vot-
ing rights to its corporations, weighting each vote according to the wealth of the 
corporation? Or could it follow the rule of one corporation, one vote? 
It would be a radical and revolutionary step to take, as it would change our 
whole concept of the franchise. 
410 U.S. at 741-42. 
68. 410 U.S. at 727-29. 
69. 390 U.S. at 485. 
70. 390 U.S. at 483. 
71. 410 U.S. at 727-29. 
72. 410 U.S. at 729. 
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ing whether all citizens are affected in ways that are sufficiently uni-
form that each citizen should have equal representation. In extend-
ing this approach to Salyer, which also involved a restriction, the 
Court relaxed the prior rigid approach73 it had taken in restriction 
cases. 
Although the Salyer method attempts to be selective in the ap-
plication of the strict scrutiny test and has a valuable flexibility, it 
also has serious flaws. Specifically, its first-stage analysis does not, 
either in its formulation or in its application, accurately detect when 
the interest in effective representation is significantly impaired. In 
particular, the inquiry at this stage into the powers possessed by the 
unit lacks predictive value and asks a question that is basically ir-
relevant to the need of potential voters for representation. The ques-
tion asked by the Court was whether the duties of the unit or official 
in question are "far removed from normal governmental activities."74 
The Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District met this test because 
it does not provide "general public services such as schools, housing, 
transportation, utilities, roads or anything else ordinarily financed by 
a municipal body."75 To fulfill this element, then, the primary re-
quirement seems to be that the unit in question be functionally 
specialized or unusual, but whether a unit provides an unusual or 
73. This shift away from a rigid approach to problems involving voter restrictions 
parallels the Court's action in another equal protection case decided in the same term 
-San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Rodriguez 
involved a claimed right to equal treatment in educational financing. Like Salyer, 
Rodriguez seemed concerned with the readiness of the Court in other equal protection 
cases to apply strict scrutiny without first examining the appropriateness of such a 
rigorous standard. Rodriguez was brought on behalf of poor and minority children who 
lived in school districts with low property tax bases. The appellees claimed that these 
children as a class were discriminated against by the state's system of school financing, 
which allowed substantial interdistrict disparities "largely attributable to differences in 
the amounts of money collected through local property taxation." 411 U.S. at 16. The 
Court had previously said that classifications based on wealth have been "traditionally 
disfavored." Harper v. Virginia Bd.·of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). The district 
court, relying on this suggestion, found the classification in Rodriguez to be suspec~ and 
thus subject to strict scrutiny. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 
F. Supp. 280, 283 r,.v .D. Tex. 1971). However, the Supreme Court refused to apply strict 
scrutiny and urged that a less facile analysis than that employed by the district court be 
used: 
Rather than focusing on the unique features of the alleged discrimination, the 
courts in these cases [lower court decisions involving school financing laws] have 
virtually assumed their findings of a suspect classification through a simplistic pro-
cess of analysis . • . • Before a State's laws and .the justifications they create are sub-
jected to strict judicial scrutiny, we· think these threshold considerations must be 
analyzed more closely. 
411 U.S. at 19. The "threshold" questions in Rodriguez included "whether it makes a 
difference for purposes of consideration under the Constitution that the class of disad-
vantaged 'poor' cannot be identified or defined in customary equal protection terms, and 
whether the relative-rather than absolute-nature of the asserted deprivation is of sig-
nificant consequence." 411 U.S. at 19. 
74. 410 U.S. at 727-28, quoting Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970). 
75. 410 U.S. at 728-29. 
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specialized service should not be determinative in an evaluation of 
the constitutionality of the related voting scheme. The critical ques-
tion is, rather, whether the impact on the citizens is so uniform that 
each citizen should participate equally in political decision-making. 
The "far removed" test does eliminate from closer consideration in-
fringements in elections for units with a broad (but indeterminate) 
range of functions that fall under the rubric of "general public 
services" and thus affect every citizen in important ways. However, 
this selection can be made more effectively by looking directly at 
the effect of the functions, as the second, or "disproportionate ef-
fects," element of the first stage of the Salyer test does. Moreover, 
the close association of the "far removed" test with the "dispropor• 
tionate effects" test in the language of the Court may encourage a 
tendency to presume that, if a unit does engage in activities not nor-
mally provided by a governmental unit, its impact will be dispropor-
tionate. This tendency is indicated by the Court's failure clearly to 
describe its inquiry as looking first to powers and then to effects. 
Instead, in Salyer, as in Avery and Hadley, the Court, describing 
the general rule and its exception, posed the choice as between a 
unit. with specialized powers and disproportionate effects and a unit 
with general powers and equalized effects and ignored the possibility 
of a unit ·with specialized powers but equalized effects. This may lead 
the Court, when it considers the effects element, to seize upon any 
disproportionate effects that exist and to downplay more generalized 
public interests, such as that of flood control in Salyer.16 
That a specialized function can have a significant general im-
portance and may even be fairly usual within a given part of the 
country is also illustrated by Salyer. Justice Rehnquist found that 
the water storage district performed a service. that was "far removed 
from normal governmental functions." But, in the Western states, 
including California, the supply of water for irrigation is essential 
to local economies, and governmental units that perform this func-
tion have proliferated.77 In an agricultural area such as that in which 
the Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District is located, a water 
storage district may be one of the most important local govern-
mental units in terms of budget and service to the residents. The 
"far removed" test as applied here ignores the context in which the 
unit in question operates. 
The analysis of the second element of the first stage in Salyer is 
similarly superficial. This element properly focuses on the effects of 
the unit on the citizenry. However, as phrased and applied, it only 
76. Compare 410 U.S. at 728-~9.n.8 with 410 U.S. at 737-38 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
77. J. BAIN, R. CAVES & J. MARGOLIS, THE WATER INDUSTRY OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA 
(1969). Justice Rehnquist does seem to acknowledge the essential nature of water pro• 
grams in the Western states. See 410 U.S. at 721-23. 
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detects any disparity in the importance and intensity of the effects 
on one group as compared to another. The Court did not examine 
the interests of the disenfranchised voters independently,. but only 
by comparison with the interests of the landowners. It would seem 
that, regardless of the disparity of interest levels between two 
groups, any group that is interested in the unit in a1;1 important 
way should not be denied representation. Although it would, in 
essence, require the Court to articulate an absolute minimum stan-
dard by which to measure the interests of different groups, such a 
method would provide a more sensitive mechanism to detect sig-
nificant impairments of the right to representation.78 
Moreover, the Court in Salyer took a narrow and shallow view 
of the interests to be considered in analyzing the relative effects of 
the water storage district on various citizen groups. The question 
of whether a group is "disproportionately affected," as the Court 
phrased it in Salyer, is very similar to the question that the Court 
considered in an earlier case involving a voting restriction in a local 
election. In Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,79 the Court framed the ques-
tion as whether the difference in interests between the enfranchised 
and disenfranchised citizens was "sufficiently substantial to justify 
excluding the latter from the franchise."80 Applying strict scrutiny 
in accordance with the· Kramer approach to restriction cases, the 
Court held invalid legislation that limited the franchise to property 
owners in a referendum to authorize the issuance of general obliga-
tion bonds to finance the improvement o~ municipal services. Al-
though the question asked by the Court was essentially the same as 
that asked by the "effects" element of Salyer, the Court in Phoenix 
gave weight to certain interests that the Salyer Court belittled. For 
example, one reason the Court gave for its conclusion in Phoenix 
was that, although the debt would be serviced in part by real prop-
erty taxes, a significant part of the ultimate burden of the property 
78. It could be argued that, in restriction cases, the Court had decided that, when a 
citizen has some basic level of interest in the functions of a governmental unit, he can• 
not be denied representation even though others have substantially greater interests. In 
City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970), the Court said: "Presumptively, 
when all citizens are affected in important ways by a governmental decision subject to 
a referendum, the Constitution does not permit weighted voting or the exclusion of 
otherwise qualified citizens from the franchise." 399 U.S. at 209. However, the holdings 
in restriction cases such as Phoenix centered on the challenged statutes' lack of precision 
in distinguishing those who were "primarily interested" from those who were not. See, 
e.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704-06 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free 
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969). The Court's findings that the statutes lacked pre• 
cision cannot be readily viewed as establishing that when a citizen's stake in a unit rises 
to a threshold level he cannot be denied representation in the unit. The Court in the 
restriction cases, as in Salyer, still seems concerned with disparities, rather than with 
absolute levels. See also text accompanying note 80 supra. 
79. 399 U.S. 204 (1970). 
80. 399 U.S. at 209. 
,, 
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tax would be passed on to lessees, so that any increase in property 
taxes due to bond assessments would be reflected by somewhat 
higher rents. 81 The Court also mentioned that property taxes on 
businesses would be passed on as a cost of doing business to all resi-
dents (not just property owners) who buy products or services pro-
duced in the city.82 
In contrast, the Salyer Court, in concluding that district land-
mmers were "disproportionately affected" by district activities, 
stressed that they bore the project costs in the first instance. 83 While 
this is accurate, it does not trace the transfer of a part of the burden 
to lessees, an important part of the strict scrutiny analysis in Phoenix. 
The Court in Salyer refused to consider seriously one of the argu-
ments that the Court had found convincing in Phoenix: 
No doubt residents ·within the District may be affected by its activi-
ties. But this argument proves too much. Since assessments imposed 
by the district become a cost of doing business for those who farm 
within it, and that cost must ultimately be passed on to the con-
sumers of the produce, food shoppers in far away metropolitan areas 
are to some extent likewise "affected" by the activities of the district. 
Constitutional adjudication cannot rest on any such "house that Jack 
built" foundation ... ,84 
While this argument may indicate that Phoenix went too far in 
tracing the economic burden, it is equally inappropriate to focus on 
tlie initial incidence of costs and completely disregard easily dis-
cernible secondary economic impacts. 86 
The Salyer analysis is also superficial in that it focuses on specific 
economic effects and fails to consider other important interests that 
may be affected by the activities of the local unit. First, Salyer ig-
nores more diffuse effects. In Phoenix the Court struck down the 
81. The proportion of property tax that a lessee bears is determined by the demand 
for rental property. If demand is very high, a higher proportion of the tax can be passed 
on. 399 U.S. at 210 n.6, 211 n.8. See also D. NETZER, EcoNOl\lICS OF THE PROPERTY TAX 
32-40 (1966). 
82. 399 U.S. at 211. 
83. 410 U.S. at 729. 
84. 410 U.S. at 730-31. 
85. The Phoenix Court may have selectively emphasized those factors that supported 
the result it desired to reach. For example, the Court discounted one economic burden 
that would have supported the franchise restriction; although the bond assessments 
could become liens on the landowner's property if not paid, the Court refused to take 
this into account because there was no demonstrated possibility of foreclosure. 399 U.S. 
at 212. Of course, assessments in water storage districts become liens on the land, See 
CAL. WATER ConE § 46280 (West 1966). The Salyer Court attached considerable im-
portance to these liens: "The California Legislature could quite reasonably have con-
cluded that the number of landowners and owners of sufficient amounts of acreage 
whose consent was necessary to organize the district would not have subjected their land 
to the lien of its possibly very substantial assessments unless they had a dominant voice 
in its control." 410 U.S. at 731. 
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restriction to landowners in part because all residents were affected 
by the quality of municipal services.86 The Kramer appellant's in-
terest in school board activities was not explicitly defined by the 
Court, but the Court did mention that he was "affected by school 
board decisions" ;87 since the appellant had no children in school 
and did not pay property taxes, this effect must have been more 
indirect-perhaps in the sense that all citizens have an interest in 
the existence of a good school system and a well-educated citizenry. 
While it is true that the primary services of the water storage dis-
trict before the Court in Salyer directly benefit only landowners, 
district activities also have impacts of a more diffuse nature. Flood 
control activities affect every district resident, and all district proj-
ects have a general effect on the local economy. Yet, these more. gen-
eralized impacts were not given any weight. 
Second, the Salyer Court ignored noneconomic effects, such as 
the subjective element of personal interest in the unit's activities. 
Again, in Kramer the Court considered this to be an important con-
sideration.88 Although the appellant in that case apparently just 
asserted that he was interested in local school affairs, 89 the Court 
seems to have considered this interest weighty enough to offset the 
fact that he did not bear any tangible economic burden in the 
form of school-related taxes.90 
This analysis of the first stage of the Salyer method reveals that, 
while that stage has the flexibility needed to evaluate mechanisms 
designed to resolve representational problems in local government, 
as applied in Salyer it does not focus sufficiently on the critical ques-
tion of impact on the citizenry. Since the outcome of this stage may 
be determinative of the entire case,91 the Court should make a more 
careful and considered analysis. The superficial application of the 
test in Salyer has been shown to have left a large margin for error. 
Because the water storage district was found to fit both elements 
of the first stage, the Court did not subject the justifications for 
franchise infringements to strict scrutiny at the second stage, but 
86. 399 U.S. at 209. 
87. 395 U.S. at 632 n.15. 
88. 395 U.S. at 632 n.15. It has been suggested that the Kramer personal-concern 
analysis would render invalid any franchise restriction. See Note, Equal Protection 
Standards and Franchise Restrictions, 83 HARv. L. REv. 77, 77-86 (1969). 
89. 395 U.S. at 640-41 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
90. 395 U.S. at 632 & n.15. It seems clear that, since the hypothetical; unemployed 
young man mentioned by the Court rented an apartment, he paid a "passed-on" prop-
erty tax, while the appellant bore no such financial burden. Yet, the Kramer Court 
characterized the hypothesized man's interest as "remote and indirect" and the ap-
pellant's as "primary and direct." The subjective element seems to be the difference 
that accounts for this treatment. 
91. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); note 
4 supra. 
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rather applied the less rigorous reasonableness test. Under this analy-
sis the Court is solicitous of the state's justifications and thus gives 
the state the flexibility. that the Court has, in some cases, properly 
recognized might be needed to deal with local problems.92 
Close analysis indicates that the justifications accepted under 
this standard of review were somewhat weak. Some of the problems 
considered cursorily at this stage should have been weighed more 
carefully in the first-stage analysis. Others, particularly those in re-
gard to which the Court neglects to consider the existence of less 
onerous methods of solving the local unit's problems, reflect the 
deliberate choice in favor of local flexibility made by the Court in 
reaching its conclusion at the first stage. The Court's second-stage 
examination of the water district voting scheme in terms of the 
rational basis test will be considered at some length. This is not to 
say that there were no rational bases to be found for the voting pro• 
visions before the Court in Salyer. But a close look at the Court's 
reasoning demonstrates the extensive freedom that the Court left 
to state decision-makers. 
The Court decided that the state could properly exclude all non-
landowners from the franchise because landowners bear the entire 
burden of the district's costs in the first instance.93 This is a reitera-
tion of the point made by the Court in its first-stage analysis of the 
unit's effects, and it contains the same flaw of focusing only on the 
initial incidence of direct economic costs.94 
The three justifications96 accepted by the Court in upholding as 
rationally based the exclusion of lessees from the franchise00 are even 
less persuasive. First, the Court expressed a fear that the enfranchise-
ment of lessees would allow large landowners to gain more votes by 
92. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968): "This Court is 
aware of the immense pressures facing units of local government, and of greatly varying 
problems with which they must deal. The Constitution does not require that a uniform 
straightjacket bind citizens in devising mechanisms of local government suitable for local 
needs and efficient in solving local problems." Similarly, the Court noted, in Sailors v. 
Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1967): "Viable local governments may need 
many innovations, numerous combinations of old and new devices, great flexibility in 
municipal arrangements to meet changing urban conditions. We see nothing in the 
Constitution to prevent experimentation." 
93. 410 U.S. at 731. 
94. See text accompanying notes 79-85 supra. 
95. In addition to these justifications the Court noted that lessees could protect them• 
selves politically by negotiating voting rights in their leases, thus mitigating the effect 
of the statutory exclusion of lessees. 410 U.S. at 733. In the Tulare Lake Basin Water 
Storage District, large landowners lease the tracts of small landowners and vote these 
tracts as proxies. Brief for Appellee at 9, Salyer v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage 
Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973). 
96. 410 U.S. at 731-33. The Court admitted that "[l]essees undoubtedly do have an 
interest in the activities of appellee district analogous to that of landowners in many 
respects." 410 U.S. at 732. Aside from the fact that district assessments are passed on to 
lessees, see 410 U.S. at 731-32, lessees also are users of district services. 410 U.S. at 731. 
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leasing small parcels to loyal employees.97 Since this problem would 
not arise under a weighted voting scheme where the land's allocation 
can only be voted once, the Court apparently assumed another 
means of allocating the vote, such as a per capita method. Even then~ 
this potential abuse could easily be prevented by a statutory provi-
sion requiring lessees actually to farm the land if they are to be al-
lowed to vote. Second, the Court noted that the state might have felt 
that landowners would be unwilling to support water storage dis-
tricts if short-term lessees with less embedded interests in the area 
were given a strong voice in district affairs.98 If the goal that the 
Court had in mind was only the successful formation of water stor-
age districts, rather than the formation of water storage districts that 
have the wholehearted support of landowners, this fear seems un-
founded. The state might have created a statutory scheme that allo-
cated votes in formation elections on a per capita basis, so that dis-
tricts could be formed by a majority of residents, even without the 
votes of the landmvners. If the Court was concerned, rather, ·with the 
possibility that a lack of landowner support could prevent the pas-
sage by the state legislature of any water storage district enabling leg-
islation that would enfranchise lessees, it might be argued in re-
sponse that, if the Court were to require that lessees be allowed to 
participate, landowners would probably support such legis,lation 
rather than do without water storage districts entirely. Finally, the 
Court noted that the inclusion of lessees would present an adminis-
trative problem, because voting lists are prepared from assessment 
rolls, which do not record leases, as well as from state and federal 
land lists.99 A voter registration procedure would avoid this diffi-
culty. 
The Court's handling of the weighted voting provision deserves 
considerable attention. It is the part of the holding that most aroused 
the ire of the dissent,100 and it best demonstrates the complex prob-
lems that arise in establishing local units that serve special purposes. 
The Court found that there was a rational basis for the weighted 
voting provision because " 'the benefits and burdens to each land-
mvner . . . are in proportion to the assessed value of the land.' "101 
97. 410 U.S. at 732. 
98. 410 U.S. at 732. 
99. 410 U.S. at 732-33. 
100. See 410 U.S. at 741-42. 
101. 410 U.S. at 734, quoting Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage 
Dist., 342 F. Supp. 144, 146 (E.D. Cal. 1972). The issue of weighted voting has arisen in 
a variety of contexts in other California litigation. See, e.g., County of Riverside v. 
Whitlock, 22 Cal. App. 3d 863, 99 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1972) (upholding weighted voting in 
a municipal improvement "majority protest" scheme); Schindler v. Palo Verde Irrigation 
Dist., 1 Cal. App. 3d 831, 82 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1969) (upholding weighted voting system of 
irrigation district). Contra, Curtis v. Board of Supervisors, 7 Cal. 3d 942, 501 P .2d 537, 
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This justification, although reasonable, glosses over several difficult 
issues. 
The weighted voting scheme in Salyer is a mechanism for dis-
tributing influence and making decisions that can be analogized to 
the corporate form, which allocates votes on a per share, rather than 
per capita, basis. In both cases, the influence allocated to a person 
is linked to the economic contribution that he has made to the 
entity. That contribution takes the form of assessments in the water 
storage district and of the purchase of shares in the corporation. The 
economic benefit that a person receives is also in proportion to his 
contribution; more returns in the form of dividends accrue to those 
with more shares in a corporation, while more water services are pro-
vided to those with more acres (and thus larger assessments) in the 
water storage district. Moreover, in both the water storage district 
and the corporation, the decision-making apparatus allocates little 
or no direct influence to certain interests affected by the unit. In a 
corporation, for example, consumers and employees usually have no 
direct representation; similarly, the water storage district legislation 
in Salyer denies any voice to nonlandowners. 
Considerations of fairness and economic efficiency underlie the 
weighted voting structures of both the corporation and the water 
storage district. Economic theory demands that the owners (or share◄ 
holders) of a corporation make the corporate decisions.102 The own-
ers bear the losses and reap the benefits produced by the firm. Moti-
vated by the self-interest of maximizing their individual economic 
gains, the O"wners can thus be trusted to seek to maximize firm 
profits. It is equitable that, among the owners, influence in manage-
ment decisions be apportioned according to the losses and profits that 
will result to each owner as a consequence of those decisions. 
The water storage district, like the corporation, is engaged in the 
production of an economic good or service. However, the district 
differs from the corporation in that the landmvners, who support the 
district by paying assessments and user charges and are thus analo-
gous to shareholders, are also consumers of the district's services, a 
position not nec1ssarily occupied by corporate shareholders. The dis-
trict is a "user cooperative," the dominant economic purpose of 
104 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1972) (striking down weighted voting protest provision in city for-
mation proceedings); Burrey v. Embarcadero Municipal Improvement Dist,, 5 Cal. lid 
671, 488 P.2d 395, 97 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1971) (striking down weighted voting in an im-
provement district created by special legislative act). 
102. See Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers and Corpo-
rate Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REv. 248, 250 (1969). As Professor Hetherington points 
out, however, the entrepreneurial function is now performed by management rather 
than by the shareholders. Id. at 251-55. See also Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Share-
holders and Management in Modern Corporate Decision-Making, 57 CAI.IF. L. REY, 1 
(1969). 
March 1974] Notes 891 
which is not the maximization of its profits but the maximization of 
the economic welfare of the individual members through the provi-
sion of district services at the lowest possible cost per unit output. 
Thus, because, like shareholders, district landowners feel the direct 
effects, good or ill, of district decisions, provision of the district's 
services at the lowest per unit cost ·will presumably be best ensured 
if they make the dec,isions. Similarly, it is only fair that those who 
stand to gain the most from the efficiency of the district in providing 
services should have the commensurately greater influence provided 
by a weighted voting scheme.10a 
Perhaps these considerations underlay the Court's emphasis on 
the economic nexus. Some of the arguments that may justify corpo-
rate representation schemes seem to appear in altered form in the 
Salyer decision to support weighted voting. Allocation of votes ac-
cording to investment in the corporation should theoretically be an 
incentive for large investments in a corporation's securities, for the 
large investor is assured that, although his risk increases with the 
amount of his investment, his influence over corporate policy, and 
his possible gains from corporate profits, rise commensurately.104 A 
similar argument is one possible justification for the weighted voting 
scheme in Salyer. The Court noted that the exclusion of lessees could 
have been motivated by a need to assure landowners that they would 
have a dominant influence, in order to gain their support for the 
formation of the water storage district.105 Weighted voting could 
similarly be justified as an inducement to large landowners, without 
whose support districts would be unlikely to be able to function ef-
fectively.106 
However, there is an element of coercion in the formation of 
water storage districts that is not present in the purchase of corpo-
rate stock, for the district is a governmental unit and a landowner 
can be made a member of the district and subjected to its assessments 
even if he does not vote for district formation or voluntarily join 
after the election.107 There are safeguards for involuntary partici-
103. For an elaboration of the theory of user cooperatives, see J. BAIN, R. CAVES & 
J. MARGOLIS, supra note 77 at 276-84. 
104. This argument is somewhat weakened by the extent to which most corporate 
decisions are made by management rather than shareholders. See Eisenberg, supra note 
102. 
105. 410 U.S. at 732. 
106. See Schindler v. Palo Verde Irrigation Dist., 1 Cal. App. 3d 831, 82 Cal. Rptr. 
61 (1969), discussed in note 43 supra. The court relied on a similar argument in up-
holding a weighted voting scheme under the strict scrutiny test. 
107. Water storage districts can be initiated by a petition of the owners of a majority 
in land value of the land in the proposed district or of 500 landowners with title to at 
least 10 per cent of the land in the proposed district. CAL. WATER Coni;: § 39400 (West 
1966). This petition, which must set forth details of the district proposal, is submitted 
to the California Department of Water Resources, which must make an order deter-
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pants. A landowner is entitled to a hearing regarding the assessment 
against his land in order to assure that it is in proportion to the 
benefit that his land will receive from a project.108 Individual proj• 
ects require the approval of a majority of both the individual land-
owners' votes and the assessed value votes.109 Moreover, the power of 
the State Treasurer to investigate proposed projects110 may provide 
some protection against abuse by the majority. However, no provi-
sion allows minority lando·wners to influence directly the types of 
projects considered by the board of directors. In short, the small 
landowner will always be in a defensive position. 
Weighted voting does enable strong private economic interests 
to use public authority to increase their resources and power.111 
Where large landholding corporations exist, they can use the re-
sources and tax base of the entire water storage district to build 
projects that, while possibly of some benefit to the small land-
owners, particularly benefit the larger landowners. The dissent 
pointed out that the convergence of private interests and public 
authority in the Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District had, on 
occasion, assumed serious dimensions. For instance, in 1969, the dis-
trict board refused to activate the flood control machinery because 
to have done so would have flooded the nearby agricultural lands 
held by the dominant landowner, the J. G. Boswell Co.112 In most 
cases, weighted voting will not give small landholders any represen-
tation at all. Representation in proportion to their small interest 
will not occur, for the directors will serve as representatives of the 
large landholders that elected them. Although small landowners can 
get some effective representation in areas where they hold the bal-
ance of power between competing and equally balanced landhold-
ers, one large corporation will often be dominant, as in Salyer, or 
the large landowners will have a solid community of interest, which 
will leave no balance-of-power role for small landowners.118 
mining the practicability, feasibility, and utility of the project. CAL. WATER CODE 
§§ 39775-800 (West 1966). The issue of formation is then submitted to the qualified voters, 
CAL. WATER CODE § 39927 (West 1966), provides that the provisions applicable to the 
general elections for the board of directors (section 41000, which restricts the franchise 
to landowners, and section 41001, which provides for weighted voting) arc applicable 
to the formation election "as nearly as practicable." See generally note 48 supra. 
108. CAL. WATER CODE§ 46225 (West Supp. 1974). 
109. See text accompanying note 55 supra. 
110. See note 54 supra. 
111. For an interesting study of how private economic interests used California 
special district enabling legislation to finance improvements to real estate development 
projects, see Willoughby, The Quiet Alliance, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 72 (1965). See also 
Cooper v. Leslie Salt Co., 70 Cal. 2d 627,451 P.2d 406, 75 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1969). 
112. 410 U.S. at 737. 
113. The California statute provides that water storage districts arc to be divided 
into divisions, "so as to segregate into separate divisions lands possessing the same gen• 
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Although weighted voting creates the clear possibility of the mis-
use of public power by private economic interests, it would not seem 
to be constitutionally invalid on the ground that it distributes voting 
rights on the basis of wealth, as appellants argued in the Salyer 
case.114 The Supreme Court has, in several cases, viewed the use of 
wealth-related classifications unfavorably.115 However, its refusal to 
accept appellants' argument was not unfounded. First, although votes 
in the water district are distributed on the basis of landholding, there 
is not a necessary correlation between the wealth of each district 
landowner and the amount of land he owns. Second, at least in theory, 
the weighted voting provision does not totally deny any landowner, 
no matter how poor, a voice in district affairs. In Rodriguez the 
Court found that there was no unconstitutional discrimination on 
the basis of wealth against students who live in less wealthy school 
districts, because they were not totally denied an education.116 
Measuring a voter's interest purely in terms of his economic stake 
neglects any subjective personal interests that the voter might have. 
The courts have not been oblivious to these claims. The Supreme 
Court affirmed a district court decision striking down a Louisiana 
statutory scheme that allowed only property owners to vote in bond 
authorization elections and allocated votes in proportion to the 
value of each voter's land. The district court noted that "there is 
no necessary correlation between the amount of an assessment and 
the degree of interest a taxpayer may have in a particular bond 
issue. A ten thousand dollar house to one person may mean more 
than a hundred thousand dollar house to another."117 
The analysis by the Salyer Court under the rational relationship 
test suffered from the same focus on economic matters that charac-
terized the analysis under the effects element of the first stage, 118 'and 
some of the justifications accepted by the Court were less than strong. 
When the Court concluded, under the first stage, that the Tulare 
era! character of water rights or interests in the water of a common source." CAL. 
WATER CODE§ 39777 (West 1966). No directors are elected by the district at-large; rather, 
one director is elected by each division to represent that division. CAL. WATER CODE 
§ 39929 (\Vest 1966). Small landowners could be represented if they were concentrated 
in one division and could control the election of that division's director. 
114. 410 U.S. at 733-34. 
115. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1970). See also McDonald 
v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1966): "[C]areful examination on our 
part is especially warranted where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth or race, . • . 
two factors which would independently render a classification highly suspect .... " 
Harper also involved the fundamental interest in voting, so that the decision did not 
rest on the wealth classification alone. 
116. 411 U.S. at 29-39. 
117. Stewart v. Parish School Bd., 310 F. Supp. 1172, 1179 (E.D. La.), afjd. per curiam, 
400 U.S. 884 (1970). 
US. See text accompanying notes 88-90 supra. 
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Lake Basin Water Storage District should be evaluated under the 
rational relationship test, it had finished the most rigorous part of 
its analysis. The state was then given not indefinite, but certainly 
wide, discretion in its choice of representational structures. Strict 
scrutiny would have, for instance, allowed the consideration of pos-
sible alternative organizational schemes that would give more pro-
tection to the interests of small landowners.119 Possible alternatives 
include the appointment, rather than the election, of directors;120 
in that case the board may not as inevitably represent large landed 
interests. Another alternative would be to give every landowner one 
vote, as is done in California irrigation districts.121 However, a rela-
tively superficial analysis of alternative means is a cost of the flex-
ibility that is left to the state through the adoption of the rational 
relationship approach. Other problems ignored by the Court-such 
as the protection of the landless and the small landowner, and the 
importance of noneconomic interests-were not sufficiently con-
sidered at the first-stage analysis of the unit's effect on the local 
citizenry. Their reappearance at the second stage again suggests that 
the earlier analysis was not made with sufficient care. 
The Court's analysis at the first stage could be seen as a means of 
detecting whether the constitutional right to representation has been 
appreciably infringed, or-as Salyer may also be interpreted-
whether the complainant has any constitutional right to representa-
tion in the particular circumstances. If the infringement is relatively 
insubstantial or the right does not exist under the circumstances, the 
state is free to form its institutions in the way that it finds most 
suitable.122 
119. When classifications abridging fundamental interests are subjected to strict 
scrutiny, the Court typically inquires into alternative methods of achieving the state's 
interests. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 351-52 (1972); Shapiro v. Thomp• 
son, 394 U.S. 618, 636-38 (1969). Cf. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 451·52 (1973). Sec 
also Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 4, at 1122. 
120. If an official is appointed, the equal protection standards required for elections 
are inapplicable. See Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967), discussed in note 
13 supra. 
121. CAL. WATER CODE § 21557 (West 1956). In addition to water storage districts, 
both California water districts, CAL. WATER CODE § 35003 (West Supp. 1974), and recla• 
mation districts, CAL. WATER CODE§ 50704 (West 1966), have voting schemes weighted 
according to land value. 
122. This type of analysis is illustrated by Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 
F. Supp. 1397 (D. Colo.), affd. mem., 399 U.S. 901 (1970). Plaintiffs challenged a provi-
sion of Colorado's annexation statute that permitted municipalities unilaterally to annex 
areas that have at least two thirds of their perimeter contiguous with the municipality. 
Plaintiffs alleged that the denial to the residents of those areas of the right to vote on 
the annexation was a denial of equal protection, since annexation of areas that were 
less than two-thirds contiguous with a municipality required the approval of the resi-
dents of the area to be annexed. The court rejected the assertion that the prior voting 
cases required application of strict scrutiny: "[I]t does not appear that the plaintiffs' 
rights are of the kind that have been upheld by the Supreme Court. The factor present 
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However, the Salyer decision can also be read as a positive affir-
mation of the state's ability to design the most appropriate organs
of local government. In dicta in earlier cases the Court has been
solicitous of institutional experimentation at the local level.123 The
importance of the need for experimentation is difficult to weigh
against the possible harms to disenfranchised individuals in cases
like Salyer because the need is intangible, but the growing chorus
of pleas for relief from the doctrine of one person-one vote 24 in-
dicates its reality.
Indeed, it might be suggested that the first-stage analysis devel-
oped in Salyer can be used not only to select those situations in
which the constitutionally protected right of certain groups to rep-
resentation is relatively insignificant or nonexistent, but also to
select those situations in which the state should be allowed to design
suitable representational institutions because local flexibility is very
important. Salyer presents as clear a situation as is likely to arise in
which a substantial departure from one person-one vote is justifi-
able. However, it can be expected and hoped that the Court will
further refine its application of the first analytic stage so that those
interests that were neglected or slighted in Salyer receive more care-
ful attention.
in the cited cases which appears to have been crucial is that the franchise was granted
to one group of persons to the detriment of another group." 308 F. Supp. at 1403. The
court upheld the provision under the rational relationship test.
Adams and Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967), see note 13 supra, indicate
that the total denial of the right to an election on certain matters does not infringe
upon a fundamental right. The extension made by Salyer is that the Court found that
neither restrictions on the franchise nor weighted voting abridged a fundamental right
even when an election was provided.
123. See note 92 supra.
124. See note 15 supra; Note, The Impact of Voter Equality on the Representational
Structure of Local Government, 39 U. CH. L. Rav. 639 (1972).
Notes
